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Criminal Law | Aug. 4, 2024

RAPE AND CONSENT

RAPE AND CONSENT

CASE ANALYSIS

SHIV PRATAP SINGH RANA V. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH & ANR. 

(Neutral citation: 2024 INSC 481)

 

FACTS OF THE CASE:

The prosecution's case was that in 2018, the complainant filed a First Information Report (FIR) alleging that in 2016, the accused had threatened her by showing her photographs and insisting she accompany him to Gwalior, or he would upload the photos on WhatsApp. Fearing the threat, she went with him, and he then committed an unlawful act against her. The accused subsequently forced her to sign an affidavit stating she would live with him for life. He promised to marry her after his brother's wedding. However, after his brother's wedding, when she raised the issue of marriage, the accused demanded Rs. 15 lakhs. When he began to threaten her, she filed an FIR against him. The accused filed an application under Section 227 of the Criminal Procedure Code (hereinafter referred as CrPC) before the Sessions Judge, seeking to be discharged from the case, but the application was dismissed. He then appealed to the High Court against the Sessions Judge's order framing charges under Sections 376(2)(n) and 506 of the Indian Penal Code (hereinafter referred as IPC), but the High Court rejected his appeal. Therefore, he is now before the Supreme Court.

 

PRINCIPLE AND LAWS APPLIED:

In the context of the case, the Supreme Court carefully examined that:

• The definition of rape under Section 375 of the IPC. 
• Section 376(2)(n) IPC, which addresses the offence of repeatedly committing rape on the same woman. 
• According to Section 375 IPC, rape is defined as any of the acts described in clauses (a) to (d) under the seven descriptions provided. Specifically, under the second description, a man is considered to have committed rape if he engages in any of the acts listed in clauses (a) to (d) without the woman's consent. 
• 'Consent' is defined in Explanation 2 of Section 375 of IPC as an unequivocal voluntary agreement, indicated by the woman through words, gestures, or any other form of verbal or non-verbal communication, expressing her willingness to participate in the specific sexual act.

The Court further clarified that the proviso states that if a woman does not physically resist an act of penetration, this alone does not imply her consent to the sexual activity.

• Section 90 of the IPC states that consent is not valid if it is given under fear of injury or under a misconception of fact. 

The Court also explored the relationship between Section 375 IPC and Section 90 IPC regarding consent in the case of Pramod Suryabhan Pawar v. State of Maharashtra. It was held that consent under Section 375 IPC requires an active understanding of the circumstances, actions, and consequences of the proposed act. A person who makes an informed choice to act after considering various alternatives and the potential consequences of those actions (or inactions) consents to the action, the Court explained.

 

OBSERVATIONS OF THE COURT:

The Court also noted that the complainant had gone with the appellant to a temple, where she voluntarily bathed under a waterfall. Her claim that the appellant had secretly taken photographs of her while she was bathing and changing clothes and subsequently blackmailed her with these photos was found to be unsubstantiated, as there was no seizure of the photographs or the mobile phone used to take them.

The Court observed, if the complainant was indeed under some kind of threat from the appellant, it makes little sense that she accompanied him to Gwalior from Dabra by train. Upon reaching Gwalior, she went with him on a scooter to a rented premises in Anupam Nagar, where she claimed the appellant forced himself on her. However, she did not raise an alarm or cry for help at any point. Instead, she returned to Dabra with the appellant, and their relationship continued even after that incident. Furthermore, the affidavit or stamp papers allegedly signed by the complainant, as well as the jewellery and the cheque from the complainant's mother, have not been recovered or seized by the police. There is also no bank statement showing the transfer of money. In the absence of such evidence, the fundamental basis of the complainant's case collapses.

The Court highlighted the following key aspects of the case:

1. the relationship between the appellant and the complainant was consensual in nature;
2. the parties had been in a relationship for nearly two years; and
3. although there were discussions between the parties and their families about marriage, these did not materialize, leading to the filing of the FIR. 

 

DECISION:

Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the impugned judgment, and dismissed the proceedings against the appellant.

 

ANALYSIS OF THE CASE:

Based on the facts of the case, the following issues could be framed for consideration:

1. Whether the relationship between the appellant and the prosecutrix was consensual in nature?

Yes, the relationship appears to have been consensual. The evidence suggests a prolonged relationship of nearly two years, during which there were no immediate objections or signs of coercion from the prosecutrix. She continued her association with the appellant even after the alleged incidents, which supports the view of consensual engagement.

2. Whether the appellant's actions constituted rape under Section 375 of the IPC?

No, based on the facts provided, there is insufficient evidence to conclude that the appellant’s actions constituted rape. The prosecutrix's lack of physical resistance and the continuation of the relationship suggest that the sexual activities might have been consensual. Additionally, the absence of critical evidence such as photographs or an affidavit weakens the claim of rape.

3. Whether the prosecutrix's consent was obtained through coercion, threats, or a misconception of fact under Section 90 IPC?

No, the facts suggest that there was no coercion or threats affecting the prosecutrix's consent. The lack of immediate resistance or alarm during the alleged incidents and the absence of evidence of coercion or misconception of facts (like the disputed photographs or affidavits) indicate that the consent was likely given without such undue influence.

4. Whether there is sufficient evidence to support the prosecutrix's claims of blackmail and coercion?

No, there is insufficient evidence to support the claims of blackmail and coercion. The key pieces of evidence, such as the alleged photographs, affidavit, and cheque, have not been recovered or presented. Without this evidence, the claims of blackmail and coercion remain unsubstantiated.

 

SOCIAL IMPACT:

Cases where consensual relationships lead to legal disputes, as in the described scenario, can have significant social impacts. They often clarify the boundaries of consent and coercion, highlighting the need for clear and mutual agreement in intimate relationships. Such cases can set legal precedents that shape future judicial interpretations, influencing how consent and coercion are understood and handled. They also serve as opportunities for public education on legal rights and responsibilities. The emotional and social consequences for both the complainant and the accused can be profound, affecting their reputations and personal lives. Additionally, the handling of such cases can impact public trust in the legal system, emphasizing the need for fair and transparent judicial processes. These cases can strain family and social dynamics and underscore the risk of legal provisions being misused for personal grievances. Overall, they highlight the importance of robust support systems and the need for a nuanced understanding of consent and coercion in both legal and social contexts.

 

COMPARISON OF THE PROVISIONS DISCUSSED IN THIS CASE TO THE PROVISIONS IN THE NEW CRIMINAL LAWS:

THE CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 1973

TO

THE BHARATIYA NAGRIK SURAKSHA SANHITA, 2023

 

THE INDIAN PENAL CODE, 1860 

TO 

THE BHARATIYA NYAYA SANHITA, 2023